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Christopher T. Selvarajah
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the impact of 'the Asian Crisis' as explained within a
globalising environment. Within this context, consequently, the Asian Cisis
itself has been identified as part of the on-going globalisation process. This
anicle begins by tracing the emergence of many East Asian nations in terms
of their rapid economic growth and development, contrasts East Asian versus
Western models of economic development, describes the evolution of Asian
versus colonial economic institutions, and traces the rise ofthe Asian Tigers,
Japan, tsm.tt-4 and the People's Republic of China. It culminates with the
events that ensued during the Asian Cisis of mid-1997 to 1998. Five "wild
cards" or key factors, advocated to contibute to a resolution of this regional
crisis are then discussed, The author concludes with a call to the inter-
national community to tackle the free Jlow of speculative investments, to
determine the type and amount of acceptable foreign direct investment, and
to determine the form of selective intervention that best suits an individual
countryk development, to avoid economic instability and impoverishment.
., ABSTSAK
Rencana ini membincangknn impak 'Krisis Asia'dalam konteks persekitaran
globalisasi. Dalam hal ini, akibatnya, Krisis Asia ini boleh dikenal pasti
sebagai sebahagian daripada proses globalisasi itu sendiri. Rencana ini
bermula dengan menyingl<np kcmunculan banyak negara Asia Timur dai segi
perkembangan ekonomi dan pembangunannya yang pesat, membandinglcan
model pembangunan ekonomi Asia Timur dengan model Barat, serta
numbandingkan juga evolusi institusi-institusi ekonomi Asia dengan institusi-
institusi ekonomi kolonial. Kemudian, rencana ini meninjau kebangkitan
" Haimau-Harimau Asia", Jepun, esneN4 dm Republik RalEat Cina, Rencana
ini memuncak dengan peristiwa-peistiwa sekitar Kisis Asia dari pertengahan
1997 hingga 1998. Lima faktor utama yang disarankan menyumbang kepada
penyelesaian krisis rantau ini, kemudiannya dibincangkan, Pengarang
mcrumusl<an rencana ini dengan menyeru kepada masyarakat antarabangsa
wtuk menangani aliran bebas pelaburan spekulatif dan menentukan jenis dan
amlrwt pelaburan terus asing yang boleh diterima, sambil menentukan jenis
4 lu*t Pcngurwsot 
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campur tangan terpilih yong terbaik untuk pembangutum 
neTnra tertentu" demi
mengelekl@n berlakunya ietiitalcstabilan ekonomi 
dan lemiskinan'
INTRODUCTION
"Given the globalised environment within which 
we operate' we should not give an
opportunity to the markets ;;;;t;"; ;t1 9red1bili! oi anv of our 
policies' " '" - Dr'
Ramasamy Thillainathan 
jO"'" i' the Asian Business' April 1996: 37)
The link between Asia's economic development and 
global economic
environment go"' Uu"tt to 
"olonial 
times whenisia before the Second World
war, served u, * ou,ooJ,.irrr" "oro.iar 
worrd. Not only almost 80 per cent
of its exports went to tf'" 
""f"tia 
powers' but also the vast bulk of such trade
comprised of ugti"'tioiat proOuc"' A specialisation in 
terms of both
destination *O outpo'*l'*"fJ*fy- "'la"nt' fhe 
trading structure that emerged
demonstrated tt e 'comilrJi" io'untug"' between ihe colonial 
powers and
tn" 
?[lTi economic changes'"howevef' are not always governed by
considerationsofthe"r"'*aconceptofcomparativeadvantage.withthe
Ermination of ttre SecoirJW"tfOW* in particular' other 
concems characterised
by political 
""onorny?ui'"* 
n'a gained significance' Fot"*:-1t ul:ng them
were the twin needs 
"r 
,Ju-ilor"i indiviJual European economies and the
preservation of gfoUaf ;a"e' Polcly makers saw the nationalistic 
character of
pre-war political 
"'i"""""'"ic 
policies- as a major threat to the latter'
Consequently, 
".onoil-unJ 
potititut u'ification or integration was on the
agenda. on the 
",#l-an;;imparutiv" 
advantage had slowly but steadily
been substituted by competitive advantage' Speiialisation' 
the core of the
comparative cost Ooctinei n""a' to be replaced 
by continuous innovation and
"nunfliioorrsation,, like all other _ ,sation, verbal nouns, implies change.
The change i, not 
"ot'f*J t on" 
area alone' According to Albrow (1997:
g6). ..Globalisation il;;; a focus of concern for groups as diverse as
politicians, tirto'i*J"g"ogt'pt'"rs' businrcssmen' management 
consultants'
economists and literary critics "' ' It conveys a widespread 
sense of
transformation of the *o.tc'. yel 6e ecommic dimension of 
the globalisation
process has incorporated the political TT*y oeeds of the post-war era'
Economic int"grution*il pt"s'Ltta -iti"ry' fmm eenrlne- mo:e's 
towards a
European iot"gutio' io 
" 
lt6ft* grour r"arigmr Today' it has reached
a stage where the *;tt-+- fT *. rcrge of breaking into blocks or
regional ."". *i,iI*i.#i -0. ls rete,rir,cl-v free but between which
protectionism dominates 
- 
rL,- imr nf the Asia
The obietire tf fut prycr b ry n"-*o 6c iryact of the i n 
crisrs as
explained sirtin a $'tfu"HtfoE curtt@- h is iE this context' the paper
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strives to examine the Asian crisis and its impact on the global economy.
Consequently, the Asian crisis itself has been identified as part of the ongoing
globalisation process.
REGIONAL TRADE
A major contributory factor in the growth of trade with Asia had been the
East Asian 'miracle' itself. Table I shows the comparative position of East
Asia with other key regions of the world. The table reveals that there had
been, between 1980 and 1995, an exponential growth of 359 per cent in exports
and 314 per cent in imports, far exceeding those for other regions. The trade
intensity index between the two years has moved from 0.86 to 0.78 indicating
ftat there had been a trade creation.
While these changes were taking place, the ongoing globalisation
Focess itself should not be ignored. Selvarajah (1998a) identified four stages
though which economic relationships of nations progresses from one based
m national interest to a more global relationship. The first stage is characterised
I a relationship based on nationalism and independence while at the extreme
cad of the developmental stage the relationship transforms into one of mutual
groffit, cooperation and interdependence of nations within a global free trade
frmework. In the 1980's, the shift towards regionalism, seen as a 'medium'
trErsrrrE prior to 'globalism', was well on its way. While the European Union
rrs fast materialising, the Association of South East Asian Nations (eseeN),
tumed tn 1967, on the Asian front was also expanding. Brunei had joined the
{lrEinel five (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) in
[9$4. At the same time, across the Atlantic, the UsA 
- 
Canada Free Trade
Auee n-as bom in 1989. In the very next year, Mexico announced its interest
fo rtrinfoE fre Area, which culminated in the formation of the North American
ncu Trade Agreement (Narre) in January 1994. Nerra also symbolised a co-
nlp'ffim between a most developed economy and a developing economy.
rt,oolftm major step in the globalisation direction (that also saw the
holmt of New Tnaland) was the origin of the Asia Pacific Economic
GhESEnrim (ApFc), formed in 1989 by twelve countries. Along with the esslN
n'i'iierldFR 6e usa, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea
re i'irlrmipd in the formation. By 1991, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan too
Mtiei@d fu ApEc. All in all, the evidence is clear that the world was moving
m fu dEmurim of a tripolar global economic focus 
- 
the EU, NAFIA, and
,m".
fi6 rnrrrTqnying feature of the globalisation process has been the manner
n ffi fu gronrt of trade was becoming more dominant than the grcwth
,dpmmsmm- Ih€h the trend of trade outpacing growth was there from thei m rrE; ,ryfur is sipificant is the alarmingrate at which this is taking place
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with the intensification of globalisation' During the perigd 
L950---1960' for
example, while the *"'ug; annual ctoll of world trade was 6'5 per cent'
output was growing at anLnual tate of 4'2 per cent' The transformation 
was
so rapid during tfr" f*t tt"* decades that ?or the 1990 - 1995 period' the
corresponding figures ;;i';p"' 
""nt 
(trade) and 2'0 per cent (output) (World
Bank 199?)' fir" ttr"" t"gi"it *""i""ed increasingly control such growing
trade. The percentage oitombined exports has incriased 
from 71 per cent in
itt'';ao per 
""ni 
in 1995 of total world exports (Table 1).
TABLE l. World trade shue Vo and rade intensity
indexes of three largest economic regions
Trade
Inten-
sity
1980
Trade
Inten-
sity
1995
Imports
" 
$ millions
Exports
$ millions
1980 1995 1980 1995
EU
7o of world trade
NAFTA
7o of world trade
East Asia
7o of world trade
Rest of the world
7o of world trade
Total World Trade
1,014,903
43Vo
369,291
l51o
315,346
L3Vo
684,300
29Vo
2,383,840
2,534,638
407o
1,087,819
lTVo
L,446,794
23Vo
1,317,660
20Vo
6,386,911
97t,9M
4L7o
388,375
167o
329,360
l4Vo
690,430
29Vo
2,380,069
2,393,84
387o
1,169,155
l9%o
L36,,865
227o
0.59 0.62
0.84 0.81
0.86 0.78
1,328J32 I
2l1o
625s,r76
Regiotwl Trade 'Growth 1980 - 1995
Exports Imports
EU
NAFTA
East Asia
World Trade
r50%
195%
359%
168%
l46Vo
2ol9o
3147o
t63%
Source; WorM Developmen! Indicators 1(-{.7' p' 2lF2l2' Adoet€d from 
Selvarajah (198c)'
The philosophical implications of these developments cannot also be
overlooked. Arguments have always been advanced favouring multilateral trade
agreements as against any form of regional group formation. Bhagwati (1993),
for example, emphasised the virtues of multilateral trade agreements as
contributing to hade creation whereas regionalism, in his view, promoted trade
diversion. It is in such a context that the role of General Agreement on Tariff
and rrade (carr) and world rrade organisation (wro) is highlighted.
However, in a growing environment of an imperfect world, where there is no
effective multilateral trading system operating even Bhagwati, has to accept
that regionalism may be the political answer to arrive at a non-discriminatory
ftee trade for all. [n order to achieve a positive political solution towards a
freer world economy, he suggests that 'it is necessary to give to it a
trogrammatic world trade system, unifying format and agenda' (p. 45).
In an effort to maintain some control over their internal economies whilette world goes through a transitional phase towards a more non-
fiscriminatory economy, nations are seen to be entering regional trade
aengements and alliances as a way of countering economic threats ofdbns and the promotion of freer trade. In this regard then, is regionalism
rrzrsitional concept leading to globalism? The answer to this lies in whetherft fumations of trade arrangements are trade creating or trade diverting. In
+c t€rms if a region contributes more to global trade since its formation
- peviously, the region is said to be trade creating. In Table I this is the
re rfth NAFTA and in a sense this is also true with East Asia, even thoughilh famalisation. The acid test in favour of regionalism then, is whether
n5[ inrcgration increases or decreases global welfare and whether regionalrft HG lead to global trade more quickly than multilateral trade.
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DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGING ASIAN NATIONS
D Gitd after world war II saw the emergence of many East Asian
r*' Tb development of these nations formed a crescent-like area fromi cnlmineting in Thailand. The development in these nations wasdee projected in Thble 2. Considering the speed ofdevelopment,iAdr miracle' aptly exemplified the phenomenon. The reasons for
rtrc vaguely understood. Political scientists, social scientists and
*e we providing ample reasons, and many of these lay in thefl. fb cmmon explanation management researchers provided wasItdl relxies were basically confucianist and this provided theph fa good business.
fr iEilL, fire rnay then equally ask whether the same culturalhecd fu the current crisis the nations are experiencing. Thereffi h ttis- Answers to the crisis may also be found in factors
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TABLE 2. GDP growth tate (Vo) of East Asia
Years/
Countries
1979-88 1989-93 1994-95 1996
NIE'S
ASEAN-4
Malaysia
China
India
8.0
4.8
7.0e
9.8
4.7
7.0
7.2
8.0e
9.0
4.8
7.5
7.7
9.5
11.6
7.2
6.3
7.0
8.6
9.7
6.9
Islam & Chowdhury (1997: 8) & Lim Kok Wing et al. (1998); e = estimated figures'
such as the level of political and social maturity of the economies, the stage
of economic development, and the impact of the 'globalisation model' on
feudalistic societies. Lall (1996) provided some explanations to why the
emerging markets of Asia have done s0 well as they have. His prescription
was that a measure of state intervention would not go wrong. He also
suggested that the models of development in East Asia were unique and were
different to the West. Not only were they different to the West, the ME's of
Asia each have a different economic model from the other.
Crenerally, the differences between Western and East Asian models of
oconomic development as suggested by Lall (1996) can be categorised as
sb*n in Ti$le 3.
TABLE 3. Western and eastern models of economic development
Westem East Asian
. Static assumption-based foundation
. Non-governmentintervention
Planning models are seen as having
'centralist' tendency
Free-market economy
. Underlying national development
policies are based on comParative
advantage 
- 
i.e. accumulation of
factor endowments
Static assumption-based
foundation are of little relevance
Government & business are often
seen in partnership
Planning models are a common
feature
Support of adjusted free-market
operations
National development policies are
based on competitive advantage
where technological caPabilitY
approaches are firm specific.
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Govemment intervention is seen as positive experience in the Asian urr,s.
Generally, the relationship between the society and the governments is
basically one of mutual respect (selvarajah 1997). Relationships are set within
the framework of a feudalistic society where respect is very much
hierarchical. The Asian developmental phenomenon views the woild as a
complex place where firms cannot operate with full knowledge of all possible
technologies. It is in this respect that the partnership between the gou"**"nt
and the firm is supported. It is also in this regard that planning-models are
pursued vigorously.
Strategic planning and the resurting intervention of govemments are seenb be the factors contributing to economic growth in Eait Asia. Lall explains
ttat the strategic planning in the NrEs involves the deepening of industrial
sEuctures and the expanding of technological capabilities. To pursue thesegmls, many East Asian nations have pursued planned shift irom import
cbstitution to export oriented industries, from agro-based industries to
cqut-oriented manufacturing industries, from manufacturing to service andtm low to high technology-based industries. Investmeni in education,
- '-g human resources and purchase of technology know-how by the Asianrmi:s have contributed to the expansion of technological capabilities. The
trrnrg features in the Asian Nre's, unlike the western economies wherehtid and technological policies are 'market-friendly', are selective. In
,fr rords, the Asian governments and industries have ,planned,
mgment of selected industrial sectors or of new industries.L my ways, Malaysia has gained or has pursued the path of economic
rpfi dTg the lines outlined above. The Malaysi* gou".n'n"nt has been[ffm in fre planning and implementation of the nation's industrial andF.'lEi"d policies. It is within this"framework that the businesses and the
qq1de- It is also this planning activity that has made Malaysia .skip
iCbw-technology exports' such as garments, leather goods-and toys.h&'tthis success continue? The following are some reasons, whichh cmtributed to the downturn in the iconomic conditions in
O) cxput structures dominated by multinational companies; (2)
and supply linkages to the local economy; (3) investment
,:{:ln of fte industrial base has been raised by fund managers,
Itcnlarive; and (4) these structures may have been unstable ford ftr stmctural upgrading as desired by the goveflrment.
TE ASIAN ECONOMIC FOUNDATION
THE COLONIAL PERIOD
h dArir played an important part in the history of both Asia& Hd Ck tr, although most of the Asian countries had
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already gained independence, the effects and influences from the former
European colonies still existed in their societies. As early as 1498, Portugal's
Vasco Da Gama arrived in India. It signified the beginning of theWestern
colonialist's dominance over the Asian people, their governments and their
economies. Why was the West able to dominate Asia for many hundreds of
years? The answer is simple; they had superiority in maritime, industrial and
military technology. They also acted as a unified force, whereas Asian
nationalism is only a recent phenomenon. Historically, much of the region
was typified by small kingdoms led by local warlords, where "divide and
conquer" worked extremely well.
Since the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the West was to make a slow
retreat from Asia. As a new world power, the Japanese fought for and gained
political control of many Westem colonial possessions. Japan's show of Asian
nationalism inspired Asia's people to revolt against their colonial rulers and
claim their independence throughout the second half of this century. During
the colonialist time, Asia's people wer€ exploitetl and repressed on education,
independence and self-confidence. However, the colonial powers played a
special role in Asia's economy and culture. The experience left far-reaching
and deep impacts on Asia's economic development, leaving a legacy of an
economic and legal system, which still survive today in many former
colonies. Figure I contextualises the development of the Asian economic
institutions within a cultural framework.
THE RJSE OF THE ASIAN TIGERS, IAPAN, ASEAN4 AND PRC
"This new regional grouping (the Asian Tigers, Japan, ASEAN-4 and Peoples'
Republic of China) has emerged as the most dynamic component of the
global economy. While the region is increasingly dominated by Japan, it has
over the last twenty years contained most of the world's fastest growing
economies ..." (Islam & Chowdhury 1997:3). When we talk about the Asian
Tigers we are referring to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea.
The AsEAN-4 is a subset of the full Association of South East Asian Nations,
namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phiiippines and Thailand. Due to their
superior growth in both cop and living standards over the last twenty years,
the two groupings when combined with Japan and more recently, China,
provide for the bulk of Asian growth, manufacturing and wealth.
Prior to Wodd War II, Japan's rise as an imperial nation played the main
influencing role in the region, in both commerce and its often brutal colonialist
moves into Korea and parts of mainland China. Following Japan's defeat in
World War II, the country was rebuilt using a combination of American
technology, low cost labour and infrastructure investment from the Allies.
These factors combined with Japan's work ethic and business style produced
Asia's first economic superpower in the 1970s. As Japan grew its economic
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o Former colonial links
. West's influence
r Japan's influence
o Industrial policies
. Expon orienution
+
Asiat Velues
Dtaocracy V Social Order
hlvidualism V Collectrvism
eEJil gew in economic power, it started to invest in what were toft Asim 'figer' economies. These economies became centres for
, initially attractive because of their cheap and well_
ad fuce. This waterfall effect was later to repeat its;lf as these
- 
t- became newly industrialised nations (xres), and they inJ I developing the economies of the ASEAN-4 and China.fl*hr tr Asian economic development has been very rapid. As
L He 2, there has been some slowing down of growth fromLtb fyr9{8 period to 7.0 per cent in the 19g9-95 pi.ioa (world
r roage of 2.9 pr cent per annum). However, in 1996. theLd thir gowrh rate at around 6.3 per cent. The lgg4-g5btc tte wat€rshed period for both the NrE,s and the AsEAN_H sell achieving 7.5 and 7.7 per cent respectively. Thelr dm evident in the assAN-4 economies in 1996 where the
t1
Indepcndenr Asie
_j-_
-
FIGLJRE l. Evolution of Asian economic institutions
d increases in the standard of living resulted in an ever increasing
p EE and relative decrease i! the cost competitiveness of its laboui
. Taxation
. Indigenous banks
. Provident funds
. fslamic banks
. Stateentreprrncurship
Culturel Impect
Societal Welfarism
Saving
Thrift
Religion
Lpn responded by inoving from low cost, iow value production tof, Hgh value-added goods base utilising high technology.
Post Colonisetion Inlluences
Colonirl Economic Iostitutions
.\slrn Economic Inrtltutionc
hfr;ryGd b 7 per cent. The performance of ASEAN-4, to an
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extent was dragged down in the period L980-1992 by the Philippines
recession. During this period, the Philippines averaged only 2 per cent whereas
the other 3 lsnAN members averaged collectively 8.5 per cent growth.
In terms of the waterfall effect noted above, China's very rapid growth
even outshone the ASEAN-4 and the Asian Tiger economies. A similar
performance is being observed in India. The rapid growth observed above
over such a short period is, however, far in excess of the growth in the
undeilying regulatory and legal frameworks required to support increasingly
sophisticated economics.
THE MAIN DRIVERS OF GROWTH AND SUCCESS
In the eseeN-4, China and India, there have been very competitive labour
markets driving their export-led growth. On the other hand, for Japan and the
NIES, they developed their economies by making use of high and new
technology and improved their competitive positioning in international
markets via high value-added goods. Table 4 shows that there has been
distinct rise over the fifteen-year period between 1980-95 in the world export
share by the main Asian economies. When compared to the us, NIE's, China's
and Japan's export growth during the same period has been tremendous.
More recently, the.asmN-4 have also grown very quickly in terms of
export share as they embark on a sifirilar process to that taken by the NIE'S
and Japan. Japan's lacklustre performance has somewhat diminished in recent
years and this is reflected in the 1995 figure. Much of the rapid economic
growth of Asian economies has been driven through the exports of
manufactured goods. Asia's competitive advantage was through the low cost,
well-disciplined work force, combined with Western and Japariese
technology. These have been the core drivers of growth.
TABLE 4. Percentage of share of world trade exports
Year/
Country
1980 1985 1989 1992 1995
NIE's
ASEAN.4
China
US
Japan
8.5
2.6
1.8
t2.5
9.4
4.4
2.5
1.0
11.6
6.9
6.3
2.5
1.5
11.8
9.8
9.4
3.1
2_2
12.3
9.3
10.3
3.7
2.9
11.4
8.6
Islam & Chowdhury (1997: ll) & IMF World Indicators 1997
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FORECAST OF AN ASIAN CRISIS
As has been discussed, Asian economies have improved their position
relative to the rest of the world dramatically over the last two to three
decades. This is reflected in the trends in world share of trade and
manufactured exports. The continual growth of Asian economies led many to
coin the phrase of the "Pacific century". Asia was expected to become larger
than the US and the Economic Union's cDp combined. Nearly every
international business textbook and journal cited Asia's financial and
economic might. An example of this was the Economist review of Asia
conducted in 1994. of the fifteen largest economies in 1992, five were from
Asia They then projected forward to 2o2o and concluded that seven of the
fifteen would be Asian, and Asia would have four out of the top five
'conomies with china, forecasted to be 40 per cent larger than the uS economy(Smomist, 1 October 1994).
Today, many of these forecasts need to be revised. While China's and5rt growth still looks very strong, many of its Asian neighbours have beenlf, bcL three to five years by the crisis.
TTIE ASIAN CRISIS
lh mset, it must be mentioned that the crisis was not something
uexpected. Nor is it true to say that the world was not warned of
and implications. The 1997 World Bank report pacific Economic
I996t97 spxially drew the world's attention to some nations in Asia
bc frcing economic problerns. In New Z,ealand, Barber (1996:22)
ffiows:
J Ik Zealand's most important export markets could be heading into
dical difficulties over the next two years ... (the report) warns of
&d for the economies of the US, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong,
ad European nations. If the predictions come true and these
,*r tatn the repercussions could set back New Zealand's own
Professor Krugman's observations are also relevant.
*r rhrr tte Asian miracle was a chimera. He reached his
h hig beyond the micro statistics of growth and national
prodrctivity performance industry by industry with
L & West (For details, see Tremewan 1998).
b dolded first in Thailand in mid-1997 
- 
ironically a
k5 Bzrk ppsft mentioned above did not pick. yet, the
ountries in the region has been rapid. The extent
t3
rdrcd in recent years and the degree of structural
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weaknesses among individual nations vastly aided the spread. By the end of
1997, dozens of banks and financial companies across the region had put
their shutters down. Till April 1999, it has been nearly two years since the
crisis began. The severity and duration of this crisis have resulted in a loss
of income and wealth. The associated social and political turmoil created in
the region too, look unprecedented. According to a conservative estimate, the
loss of wealth in Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Philippines
is about 60 per cent of their combined pre-crisis GDP, which is over us$600
billion. Unemployment forecasts vary from 3.5 per cent in Malaysia - a labour
deficit country earlier 
- 
to nearly l7 per cent in Indonesia for 1998.
It is not the intention of this paper to elaborate this grim picture and
analyse the reasons for such an outcome. (An analysis on these lines
including possible remedies can be found in Selvarajah 1998b and Adnan et
al. 1999). Instead, the aim is to view the crisis within the globalisation
process. Globalisation has seen, as already discussed, a dramatic rise of the
Asian economies in the last two to threqdecades.'trt had even been anticipated
that Asia's total output would exceed the combined cop of the usl and the
European Union in the 21" century. But this overwhelming success had led
to a degree of complacency and neglect of several key factors necessary for
the sustenance of high level growth.
Five such factors emanating from internal conditions could be identified:
(1) The build-up of overheating pressures manifesting in large external
deficits and inflated property and stock market values; (2) The maintenance
of pegged exchange rate regimes for too long a period. This complicated the
response of the monetary policy to overheating pressures, which came to be
viewed as implicit guarantees on exchange value. Consequently, external
bonowing 
- 
often at short maturity 
- 
was encouraged leading to excessive
exposure to foreip exchange risk in both the financial and corporate sectors;
(3) The weak management of financial systems contributed to poor conhol of
risk facton, lax enforcement of prudential rules, inadequate supervision, and
goverilnent direct€d lending practices. The combined effect of all these was
a sharp deterioration in the quality of banks' loan portfolios; (4) The lack of
traffiparency and problems of data availability hindered market participants
from maintaining a realistic view of economic fundamentals. In the long run,
it breeds an element of uncertainty; (5) Asia's political elite were closely
involved with the growth especially with the business sector. hoblems of
govemanoe in many Asian countries have become a major obstacle to their
globalisarion polices. Consequently, conflict of interest prevents reforms from
being implemented.
Apafi from these intemal factors, external forces too, played a role (rur
1998: 3). In the large-scale flow of private capital into the region the
international investors tended to underestimate the risks. This was
particularly true during a period when sluggish economic growth in Japan
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and Europe necessitated low interest rates and made investment opportunitiesin those countries appear less profitable. The desire for higher yi"ta, nua
contributed towards rhe overlooking of risks. with the pegging of exchange
rates to the us dollar, wide swings in the yen/dollar rates 6it*""n 1994 and
1997 resulted in shifts in international competitiveness that proved
unsustainable, leading to a build-up ofthe crisis. one particular instance was
when from mid-1995 the appreciation of the dolrar contributed to an export
slowdown and loss of competitiveness. A number of countries in the region
rrcre badly affected during the period 1996197.
kom the foregoing account it is clear that the seeds of the crisis wereir tte process itself. countries have become victims of their own success.Tb crisis, in a manner, has applied the brakes on the globalisation process.
rHo has the power to create repercussions not for Asia arone, but foithe restd the world.
In retrospect, it is easy to indulge in 'I said so'remarks. There is plenty6[ rftzr both in the west and in Asia. Raderet and Sach (199g: 5) have4EFd tle acceleration of the crisis as follows: ..... The basic notion ish i*ernational loan markets are prone to self-fulfilling crisis in which
ry"t creditors may act rationally and yet market out ori., produce sharp,dg d ltodamentally unnecessary panicked reversals in capitar flow".r'rl (1996), though agreeing with the N,"'s developmental moders,o-i=d m aspects of the policies, especially in reference -to foreign invest-m- Tb planning seems to have some risk elements which ap-peared tohG h rEatise4 as explained by Radelet and sach (199g). The iollowing
tE upcricncea by ailing economies in Asia, seem to have contributed to& m'*rfon of the crisis: (l) too much reliance on fund managers forffu -mment funds; (2) investmart shourd rargely be on export-perfor-
re 
-',EE; (3) infrastructure development out-of-kilt with technologyHt&dryenq (4) "leap-frogging" on the industrial development ladder
llhlitv - cspecially during an economic crisis; and (5) shortening ofmerr qrch on borrowed funds may not pay off in a crisis.
FIVE WILD CARDS
,ryuhfu be adopted by the main ASEAN nations then there is someHFhfue*smcnt of the Asian business fundamentals will result in a
fherr*ia economies have reached the bottom of the bear cycle,ilb&w d m come?lm fu .Er.rlfus may well have reached the bottom of currencyhrdt{F drop6 in stock market values, this is but the first trough
ffip d ryc robust regional economy. However, before we canffitr fu* &E rebuilding of tattered economics, we must first ask
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in three related business cycles, namely the financial' economic and social
"v"r"'.SincethebeginningofThailand'sfinancialcrisisinJulyl99Twehave largely witnessJ the financial crisis, that is, paper los e  in weallh through
drops irittre region,s currencies and stock markets. These financial problems
flow through to effect the real economy in terms of business and banking
failures ,"*tting in an economic crisis' Lastly, the very real economic crisis
inturncausesmassivesocialandpoliticalupheavalwiththelikesofhuge
onemployment,lossofwealthandincomeanditssocialissues.Allthisplaces
increasing pressure on the incumbent political parties and leadership - whom
the people hold responsible for their new found situation'
edtfre three cyiles are related and a major adjusfinent in the social and
political scene of a country will affect its financial and economic situation'
Inthissensetheeconomiesmaywellhavenotreachedthebottomofthe
crisis. There are several "wild cards" which could further weaken the regional
economies.
There are at least five key factors or "wild cards" that are as yet
unresolvedandanyoneofthemcouldfurtherweakentheAsianeconomies
and have flow-on effects to the west. These are, (1) the potential for massive
social and political unrest in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia' (2) how
Japan will ieact to the crisis, (3) China's continued fortitude and resilience'
1+; tt," Indian economy's 
.experiment, with liberalisation and (5) the threat
of renewed western p.otectionism. Each of these issues will now be briefly
examined.
Inlg65,Indonesiahadaseriesofraciallymotivatedriotswhereover
500,000mainlyoverseasChineselndonesianswerekilled'Theriotshad
occurred after tire Indonesian State suggested that the overseas Chinese, some
of them residents for many generations, were behind a communist plot to
overthrow the government. ttioughout Asia the overseas Chinese have played
core roles in commerce, initially acting as the middlemen for the colonialist
powersandmorerecentlycontrollingthgbllkoftheregion,swealththrough
a network of family businesses and iacial ties. The real danger in Indonesia
today, is that the government may attempt to deflect interest in its own
corrupt practices by suggesting that there should be some forq of wealth
redistribution from the 
-or"tt"ut 
chinese. The overseas chinese control 70
;;;;; of Indonesia's wealth while only accounting for 3 per cent of the
country's 220 million inhabitants. In the economic crisis, many overseas
chinese have fared better than their Indonesian nationals who were much
higherleveragedandwillingtotakehigherrisksintheirpursuitoffinancial
gfi*tfr. farty in March 1998, the Indonesian government announced that they
ivere increaiing the army by 1 million new recruits. The real danger is that
conflict with the or"rr"u. chinese could lead to nation-wide chaos and the
exit of Indonesia's chinese nationals bringing further economic problems to
the countrY.
Guest Commentary: Globalisation and Emerging Nations 17
In May 1998, the crisis in Indonesia reached a crescendo with president
Suharto stepping down in favour of Dr. Jusuf Habibie. The new president has
pnomised immediate political reforms and anti-comrption drives.
Since the early 1990's, Japan has been in its own financial crisis which
saw the property market fall by some 70 per cent, a series of financial
sndals involving senior government officials and the collapse of several
mjor finance and banking corporations. prior to the broader criiis, Japan was
hcusing on dampening domestic demand in order to ease inflation and the
hge trade deficit with the u.S. The time is right for Japan to kick-start
ryimal growth through the opening up of its economy to low cost Asian
cryfrts and through renewed rot in its Asian neighbours. Should Japan taketh opposite approach of a fortress mentality combined with re;trictivefuesic growth, then it could put the region's recovery back several years.
rb date, china has remained a pillar of growth in the region with l99g
!86 in cop forecast at7 per cent. china is largely shielded from the worstd &c crisis since its currency is not directly transferable to foreign
Fail, is markets have been left intact due to strong domestic consumptiondfurard trade with the west. How long China can maintain its fortitudeh ft fie of increasing low cost competition from Asia and mountingH pressures to reform its over-employed state sector, is the question.Er &ie has not been effected greatly by the crisis. This is partty oue to
!lFt" is exchange and capital markets are not as open or frenzied as) * 'ast Asian counterparts. The medium term hearth of India will
o how well it maintains its move towards state sector reforms, and
ryctitive its industries remain in the face of devalued Asian exports.
Fobctionism in the West has the potential to hold back Asianfu syeral years. As Asia tries to export its way out of trouble, it
e'n$ing for Western countries like the U.S. to revert to tradeb Foect local industry.h ft long mn, the current crisis should be seen as a necessary
baoverheated region, lacking the sophistication in its businessd infrastructure to support its own growth. While in purely& economies of Indonesia and Thailand have shrunk back totb nunbers are deceptive. Table 5 shows how the crisis-hitfud frmcially in 1997-98, in terms of their non-performing Ioansr+t In 1998, eseAN countries including Singapore, registered
'G d 73% in real outpur (1997: +4.6Vo). A Malaysian Central
crrd drat throughout 1998, the crisis countries underwent
namely banking sector consolidation and recapitalisationd marforming loans. Strengthening prudential regulation
ilprate rcstructuring and governance gained momentum
I April 1999: 6). Recent improvements in the real estate
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1997 and 1998TABLE 5, Financial indicators of crisis bountries in
(end Periods)
Countries ML's (7o
of total
loans)
- 1997
NPL's (7o
of total
loans)
- 1998
Extemal
Debt
(us$Bn)
- 1997
External
Debt
(us$Bn)
- 1998
Malaysia
Philippines
Korea
Indonesia
Thailand
4.7a
5.4
2.7
8.2
19.8
13.2a
11.0
10.5
63.3
45.9
43.8
45.4
158.1
136.1
93.4
42.O
46.4
151.5
143.0a
86.2
a = Refers to non-performing loans' (ML's) classification of 3 months
Sorrce: Adnan et al. (1999: 6)
sector recorded in the first quarter oi tggg, further indicated early signs of a
;;i .",irg in several of thesi countries' The underlying volume of goods and
servicesinAsianeconomiesisstillforecasttocontinueatahealthylevel.
When purchasing power parity is used to compare equivalent baskets of 
goods
within the region, u -or" positive picture in terms of the underlying
economic conditions can be seen'
Most of the nar reforms are likely to be implemented by Korea and the
ASEAN-4(includingThailandandlndonesia);theywillsimplyJindittoo
difficulttostabilisetheireconomieswithouttheMF'sblessingandthemuch.
needed dollar. However, Malaysia is the exception. Sulong (1999: 2) (as
iigfrfignteO in Table 6) pointedlut the strongly divergent recgvery strategies
between those advocated by Malaysia and the rur' One would appreciate that
Malaysia has its own modll of nursing its ailing economy back to- recovery
Cft{i"ti" 1999). As shown in Table 7, among those most severely hit by the
"oi"n"y 
crisis, Souttr Korea, followed by Malaysia and Thailan!- seem to be
the fasiest to see their recovery remedies bearing fruit. Notwithstanding a
worst case scenario of several of trre wila cards eventuating, it is very likely
that the region will gradually return to healthy growth over the next three to
nr" v"r, p".ioa. AsL wil aiso be able to sustain its competitiveness. As the
O"* Jto-r, it may be on top of a much more robust business framework
Ihat could sustain fur*rer growttr for several decades'
CONCLUSION
Thesinglemostbenefitofglobalisationisthatitbringsnationstogetherin
a cooperative arrangement rather than in competition' It removes obstacles to
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TABLE 6. Two contrasting approaches to recovery: IMF and Malaysia
IMF's Prescription MALAYSIA'S Prescription
l. The security of the banking system is
Irdamount. Banks should be allowed to
determine their own lending policies.
Z Financially-troubled banks
rhould be allowed to fail.
3. The banking industry should be
tlrown open to foreign investment in
cder to recapitalise the industry and
iryrove management. Non-performing
bos of banks should be sold at the
caliest possible opportunity and
fueigners should be allowed to
pchase them.
4. Interest rates should be forced to
ircrease, to defend the currency.
5. The exchange rate of any iurrency
chould be left to market forces.
6 Financially troubled companies should
bc allowed to go bankrupt and liquidated.
Tkir assets should be sold to enable
fueigners to purchase them at the
cdiest opportunity.
l. The security of the banking
system is critical, but banks operate
in a larger economic environment
and they have a role to play in
economic revival.
2. No bank should be allowed to fail
as it could trigger a systemic collapse
of the industry.
3, Have set up Danaharta to deal
with non-performing loans, and
Danamodal, to inject capital to
recapitalise ailing banks.
4. Interest rates should be lowered as
high interest rates will kill many
businesses, turning the recession into
a depression and causing massive
unemployment.
5. No developing country can defend
its currency against the might of hedge
funds and currency speculators.
Selective foreign exchange controls
imposed since September l, 1998,
stabilises ringgit exchange rate at
RM3.80 to Us$l. It also allows the
government to lower interest rates to
stimulate business activities.
6. Have set up the Corporate Debt
Restructuring Committee (CDRC) to
act as mediator between debt-ridden
companies and creditor banks to find
workable solutions to loan repay-
ments.
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TABLE 7. GDP growth rates* for East Asian^countries: 
pre-crisis (1996)'
unO t"'i"J estimates for 1999 & 2000
t991 1998 1999
2000
r996
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
MalaYsia
SingaPore
South Korea
Taiwan
Thailand
3.1
2.5
0.3
2.0
4.2
4.6
4.8
3.0
4.9
7.8
n.a.
8.6
6.9
7.1
5.7
5.5
5.3
4.6
1.4
1.7
8.0
5.5
6.8
- 0.4
- 5.1
- r3.7
- 2.8
- 6.1
1.5
- 5.5
4.9
- 8.0
- 1.3
- 4.0
- 1.4
1.0**
0.5
2.O
3.9
1.0
*-**ratesaxecarc{ya.r1s{..:'f }":::::"it1t'J*"i:H;;:Hl';r:i#"Tf xrIJ*:il:,fiiq:{1"'',strUn:"'26April',,:."':::"3l#Jtffi 'B;.i*.' z+ Y? l-?:l 
"P.3lI;Gfflr.*i:l- *, TT"iiff :ffi 'e3L':l?'ii?J;i iJ'a ruurov'iu'' I eee's cDP to be**UP to
4.3%.
growth.andu:,"l"lT:",1;.Tyri]ffS,f 3rluJ'fffi #:iijii[i;:
this is that, unless econo*'"-t 1:^o::l 
" ",*-" 
itr' a blessing. Globalisation
:1,1,',n:;,5l.:#::mi&:i[+,]"J:t"ty#i*ru"U",'l:
*ilhttf ';Tffi'llJlff ffi "#"'il;'"r'"*'';;;Gendenceand
cooperation' 
' rn would be to highlight' in the context 
of the' ongoing
A fitting conclustt
elobalisation process, :il";'t; "r"r""fi"-. 
i, ,fte evolution of any nation's
iroing paftern' *t otil* "itt'" itgi"i"g 
of this essay sates that a country
'shouldnotgive*d;;;;ilio'"t'"1*rt"t'ioqu"ttionthecredibilitvof
... policies' rrnilanltPt'"a" ig6o' lil' vt1 lunv nations 
in their evolving
trading pa$ems n""' l'i"*'"Jy' utio*"a tr''itio ttupp"n' Many 
of the Asian
nations hit by the 
""ono*i" 
crisis have q*:;;d growttr policies with little
safeguards and had ";;;;;;;s 
affi$ae r* utitin"tt investors"similarlv'
developed nations 
'oti? i'#;;'il"4.e'*"rr"' 
after being dumped bv
Briuin when it 
"r,"r"i 
*" 
"r", 
r""o"o to the Asian region as a single 
entity
for salvaging is 
'ec""ionary 
prone economics' Infrastructures 
-are 
in place
for long-term *f^,i""Jtipr*il iri" una *f,ultii. togg"ttt 
for New Zeala.,d
and Australia it tt'ut'in'In";;;f;t"' tt'"'" ""onoiiies 
will bear the brunt
" 
-#r"f"T"",ifi13:,tT=Ftlf l-",: crisis on 
other economies' the
enormity 
"' 
*" *r""i i''"uif it it' 
"u'fy''tug"s' 
As at October 1998' the
crisis itself h"' ov nl"i'*n;;;;; *;d' il the crisis deengls' 
the effect
on the world 
""oni*' *'i' t; doubt' "t""f"t"' 
This would be further
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exacerbated when major trading partners too are affected. The evidence of the
current downturn in Russia is a case in point. The ripples this downturn has
created on the global scenario have not failed to extend to neighbouring
countries such as Australia and New zealand. Any conclusion drawn in
respect of the direct as well as the indirect impact of the crisis would,
lherefore, either be hasty or rather pre-mature.
on the other hand, when the composition is considered, specialisation in
prinary commodities has been the continuing trend from colonial days.
Although former colonies have always been conscious of this and much
effort have gone towards the diversification of their economies, it cannot be
claimed that the 'commodity' tag has altogether been expended. The
development of manufacturing, for example, could not be continuously
sustained. A clear illustration of this is provided during recent appreciation of
currencies when a number of industries, in nations with appreciated
anrrencies, either closed down or changed their location to neighbouring
ountries.
Anumber ofAsian leaders, including the Malaysian prime Minister, Datuk
seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, have raised concerns about speculative
inyesEnents that seem to flow freely from one country to another as foreign
direct investment. As globalisation takes hold, the free flow of speculative
investrnents is and will become an issue that the intemational community will
hve to tackle. The issue of how much and what type of foreign direct
irvesunent is acceptable, and which type will contribute to development and
enoid economic instability will have to be determined. Another area that may
red close attention is the form of selective intervention that best suits
&velopment in individual countries. In this instance, global prescriptions,
bwever, are not useful.
Asian countries also require a more multifaceted trade outlook in termsd both direction and composition. So long as 'all eggs are praced in one
hket', the volatility arising from global conditions cannot be avoided.
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